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	who have secured at least 50% marks in aggregate shall be qualified for appointment to the post of Distric***t*** Judge is quashed.
3.	***Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Ltd & Others,*** (2022) 6 SCC 211 Discrepancy in date of birth recorded in the service book and statutory Form B. In the service book date of birth was recorded as 21-9-1949 while in Form B it was stated to be 21-9-1945. Correction in date of birth was made by employer in service book as per Form B unilaterally without hearing employee at fag end of his career. It was held that unilateral exercise of correcting age entry in service book on perception that error was being corrected, without granting opportunity of hearing to appellant, at the fag end of his service tenure is impermissible.
4.	***Kerala Public Service Commission v. K.N. Radhamani and Others,*** (2021) 15 SCC 501 If an advertisement is made providing for eligibility criteria different from that statutority prescribed, it would be open to the candidates to challenge the legality of such eligibility criteria. We do not think in the peculiar circumstances of this case it was permissible on the part of KPSC to prescribe qualification as minimum eligibility criteria which is beyond that prescribed by the statute. While it is true that none of the candidates have had challenged the legality of the qualification condition stipulated in the advertisement, majority have come to this Court at a time in close proximity to the publication of the Employment Notification. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Public Service Commission on the basis of performance or position in the selection process of these applicants for intervention.
5.	***Praveen Kumar C.P. v. Kerala Public Service Commission and Others,*** (2021) 17 SCC 383 Whether a G.O. would have prospective effect or relate back to an earlier date is a question which would have to be decided on the basis of text and tenor of the respective orders. The G.Os. which declared appellants' degrees to be equivalent to those required as per the applicable notifications were not general orders but these two orders were person specific, relating to the two appellants. Once the G.Os. specifically declared that their B.Ed. degrees were equivalent to the designated subject which formed part of the employment notification, the G.Os. in substance have to be interpreted as clarificatory in nature and these cannot be construed to have had elevated the status or position of the degree they already had after the declaration was made in the GOs. The GOs only confirmed the equivalency of their B.Ed. degrees. In our opinion, they shall be deemed to have had the equivalent qualification on the relevant date. As we have held that the respective GOs only clarified or confirmed an existing status of certain educational qualifications, in absence of specific instance of similarly situated but unspecified number of persons having not applied for the posts would be unfair to the ones who apply for the same and undergo three levels of litigations to establish that they had equivalent degrees. The judgments under appeal are accordingly set aside and the orders of the Tribunal dated 20-09-2019 and 02-09-2019 shall stand restored. The court directed that the result of the appellants be disclosed and in the event, on the basis of their performance, they come within the list of selected candidates as per the ranked lists, the benefit thereof shall not be denied to the appellants on the ground of lapse of the list by efflux of time. In the event they qualify for appointment, they shall be given appointment and they shall be treated to have been in service from the date of their appointment in their respective posts.

6.	***Malik Mazhar Sultan and Another v. U.P. Public Service Commission Through its Secretary and Others,*** (2020) 10 SCC 524 Schedule for filling up vacancies fixed by Supreme Court in *Malik Mazhar Sultan (3), (2008) 17 SCC 703* which was to commence with notification of vacancies by 31st March every year and culminate with issuance of appointment letters by 30th September. Notification of vacancies for the year 2020 not done because of outbreak of pandemic and announcement of lockdown by 24-3-2020. Hence, schedule revised. M.P. High Court directed to review situation once every month beginning from first week of November 2020.
7.	***Runa Chakraborty v. West Bengal College Service Commission,*** 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 1751 This case relates to a dispute regarding the appointment of petitioners as Lecturers in two different colleges under the Calcutta University zone. Neither of the two petitioners was NET or SLET qualified. They responded to the advertisement on the strength of their M. Phil degree. Runa Chakraborty participated in the selection process and was initially recommended for Malda College while Ria Mukherjee was issued a call letter and went through the process of interview. Later the recommendation was withdrawn and the appointment letter was not issued. The reason for such steps being taken by the Commission was that none of them had done her M. Phil in English because they have their M. Phil in Women's Studies. The Commissions' stand was that the candidates seeking to bypass the entry test being NET or SLET on the basis of M. Phil, will have to do M. Phil in the very same subject for which they apply for Lectureship and Women Studies in which they did their M. Phil is not the same as English. It was held that there is already a judgement of a Division Bench as well as a coordinate Bench holding that "concerned subject" does not mean the "same subject". This being the position, and since both Calcutta University and Jadavpur University, the two premiere universities of the country have opined that the subjects are relevant, the court held that for lectureship in English in respect of the posts involved in the said advertisement, degree of M. Phil in Women's studies from Jadavpur University would constitute M. Phil in concerned subject so far as the eligibility criteria laid down in the subject advertisement is concerned. The Commission was directed to take appropriate steps to complete the process of recommendation of the petitioners to the respective colleges within a period of four weeks.
8.	***Sri Dhiraj Ghosh v. Union of India,*** AIR 1991 SC 73: (1991) Supp 2 SCC 203. Where the appointment of a temporary employee is made for an unspecified or indefinite period of time, he cannot claim that he has been automatically confirmed on the expiry of the period of appointment. It is true, that the period can be extended indefinitely. But that does not mean that the services of the incumbent holding the post would be extended.
9.	***Director v. Sitadevi,*** AIR 1991 SC 308: (1991) Supp 2 SCC 378. A question as to disputed age would not ordinarily be gone into in a writ petition because it is a question of fact. A decree passed against a University or Board to correct the date of birth is not binding on the Government if the State has not been made a party. It can only be treated as evidence.
10.	***Executive Engineer, Bhadrak (R and B) Division, Orissa v. Rangadhar Mallik,*** (1992) 2 UJ SC 453: (1993) Supp 1 SCC 763.

	Where an employee has throughout his career accepted a particular date as his date of birth, by his own statement, and near about the date of his superannuation, he makes a representation and files some documents, the order of the relevant authority, made upon a consideration of those documents, cannot be assailed on the ground that the order of rejection of his representation was made without giving him a personal hearing.
11.	***State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal,*** (1991) 1 SCC 691 The court has summed up the position as under: (a) If, on the perusal of the character roll entries or on the basis of preliminary inquiry on the allegations made against an employee, the competent authority is satisfied that the employee is not suitable for the service whereupon the services of the temporary employees are terminated, no exception can be taken to such an order of termination. A Government servant has no right to hold the post; his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Government servants. (b) However, it has been made it clear that if the competent authority decides to take punitive action, it may do (only) by holding a formal inquiry by framing charges and giving an opportunity to the Government servant in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
12.	***Triveni v. State of Uttar Pradesh,*** AIR 1992 SC 496: (1992) Supp 1 SCC 524. There is no question of application of Article 311(2) where a person's services are sought to be terminated at the expiry of the term for which he was engaged or at the expiry of the period of notice by which, in accordance with the conditions of his services, his services could be terminated, provided of course, the contract itself is not unconstitutional, say, for contravention of Article 311(2).
13.	***M. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala,*** AIR 1973 SC 2641; (1973) 2 SCC 650 The abolition of post is an executive policy decision and discharge of Government servant on account of abolition of post does not attract Article 311 of the Constitution. Whether after abolition of the post the government servant who was holding the post would or could be offered any employment under the State would, therefore, be a matter of policy decision of the government because the abolition of post does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold post. A government servant cannot complain of violation of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 312 of the Constitution when the post is abolished.
14.	***State of Haryana v. Des Raj,*** AIR 1976 SC 1199; (1976) 2 SCC 844 The abolition of post in good faith and the consequent termination of the services of the incumbent of that post would not attract Article 311 whether a post should be retained or abolished is essentially a matter to be decided by the government.
15.	***Gajraj Singh v. The State of M.P.,*** AIR 1973 SC 1285; (1973) 1 SCC 793 The decision not to absorb persons could not amount to any punishment for the reason that they were not yet absorbed or continued in service of the new State and had, therefore, not become its employees. Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted.

16.	***Mohd. Sagiruddin v. Distt. Mech. Engineer, N.E.F. Rly.,*** AIR 1973 SC 1306; (1973) 4 SCC 133 Where the employee being found unfit for the existing job was given some other job to avoid his discharge from service, the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were not attracted, as there was no question of punishment.
17.	***Oshiar Prasad v. M/s BCCL, Dhanbad, Jharkhand,*** AIR 2015 SC (Supp) 1050; (2015) 4 SCC 71 In claim for absorption in service, concurrent finding that the claim is not justified, being finding of fact would not be interfered in appeal.
18.	***T.N.R.D. Engineers Association v. Secy. to Government, R.D. Department,*** AIR 2014 SC 159 Absorbee is not entitled to benefit of past service rendered in parent department for promotion to higher post.
19.	***Chief Executive Officer, Pondicherry K. & V.I. Board v. K. Aroquia Radja,*** AIR 2013 SC 1805 (1811); (2013) 3 SCC 7870 Absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees appointed/recruited and continued for long in public employment de hors the constitutional scheme of public employment is impermissible and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
20.	***UOI Through Govt. of Pondicherry v. V. Ramakrishnan,*** AIR 2005 4295: (4300): (2005) 8 SCC 394 A deputationist indisputably has no right to be absorbed in the post to which he is deputed. However, there is no bar thereto as well. It may be true that when deputation does not result in absorption in the service to which an officer is deputed, no recruitment in its true import and significance takes place as he is continued to be a member of the parent service. When the tenure of deputation is specified, despite a deputationist not having an indefeasible right to hold the said post, ordinarily the term of deputation should not be curtailed except on such just grounds as, for example, unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance. But, even where the tenure is not specified, or an order of reversion can be questioned when the same is *mala fide*. An action taken in a post haste manner also indicates malice.
21.	***Raja Singh v. State of U.P.,*** 2019 (5) Supreme 600. Employee who has been sent on deputation has no right to claim absorption.
22.	***Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana,*** AIR 1987 SC 478; (1985) 4 SCC 43 Where the services of *ad hoc* teachers were terminated before the commencement of summer vacation, it was held that the termination of the services of the *ad hoc* teachers was against the protection available under the Constitution and they should be re-inducted into the regular vacancies.
23.	***R. Venugopal (Dr.) v. State of Kerala,*** 1988 (3) SLR 746; (1988) 57 FLR 617 (SC) *Ad hoc* employees may be allowed to continue till regular appointees are available.
24.	***Himansu Kumar Bose v. Jyoti Prokash Mitter,*** AIR 1964 SC 1636 While in office, a judge of the High Court must satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has attained the age of 60 years. Mere declaration of age is not sufficient and it would be

	unreasonable for any judge to suggest that the question regarding his age cannot be raised just because he made a declaration before his appointment and the declaration was accepted by the Government of India. His age can be judicially decided.
25.	***G.M. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad,*** (2000) 8 SCC 696; 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155. In the instant case after about 20 years of service under the former employer and under the appellant Company, the respondent raised the claim that his date of birth was 9 February 1946 and not 1932. The appellant, following the procedure for determination of the date of birth/age of an employee in such case, as provided under "Implementation Instruction No. 76," authenticity of which was not disputed by the parties, referred the matter to the Medical Board and instructed the respondent to appear before the Board. The Medical Board after examining the respondent determined his age as 52 years in 1988. Accepting the report of the Medical Board, the appellant held the year of birth of the respondent as 1936. Thus the respondent was given the benefit of superannuation in 1996 instead of 1992. The High Court in writ petition directed the appellant to correct the date of birth of the respondent as 9 February 1946. The Division Bench modified the judgment of the High Court to the effect that the respondent is to superannuate in the year 2004 instead of 2006, for the reason that "he was at that time only 14 (fourteen) years of age and the statutory age limit being 16 (sixteen) years and he should not be allowed to continue up to two thousand and six but he should continue up to two thousand and four and it shall be treated as if he has joined at the age of 16 (sixteen) years." In absence of any arithmetical or typographical error apparent on the face of the record, High Court should not interfere with such decision of the employer in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. On facts, management correctly referred the matter to Medical Board and accepted determination of age of the employee by the Board in accordance with the procedure laid down under its instructions and therefore, High Court's interference under Article 226 with the decision of the management was not called for.
26.	***Updesh Kumar v. Prithvi Singh,*** AIR 2001 SC 703; 2001 (2) SCC 524 Prithvi Singh obtained the birth certificate in February 1986 and his date of birth shown in that certificate is 26 December 1951. This very much tallied *vis-à-vis* the dates of birth of his siblings. Prithvi Singh submitted an application for correction of his date of birth in Matriculation Certificate and the Haryana School Education Board corrected his date of birth in the school certificate issued to him. The correction of date of birth in the certificate is an official act and it must be presumed to have been done in accordance with law.
27.	***Union of India and Anr. v. R.G. Kashikar and Anr.,*** (1986) 1 SCC 458
28.	***Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors v. Uma Devi (3) and Ors.,*** (2006) 4 SCC 1
29.	***Tinku v. State of Haryana & Ors.,*** Civil Appeal No. 8540 of 2024
30.	***Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers Union,*** 2024 SCC Online SC 270
31.	***Local Adminstration Department and Anr.v. M. Selvanayagam Alias Kumaravelu,*** (2011) 13 SCC 42
32.	***Union of India v. Harnam Singh,*** (1993) 2 SCC 162
33.	***State of M.P. and Ors. v. Premlal Shrivas,*** (2011) 9 SCC 664

CASE LAW *(Judgments mentioned below includes citation and short note for reference and discussion purpose during the course of the programme. Please refer the full judgment for conclusive opinion)*	
1.	***Prem Lal Korde v. Jakir Khan and Others,* (2022) 15 SCC 614** It is a matter of record that the appellant belonged to the category of "Other Backward Classes" and was also an "Ex-serviceman". He was given employment relying on 10 per cent horizontal reservation meant for "Ex-serviceman". It was not the case of respondent no.1 that the quota meant for "Ex-serviceman" in the vertical column of Other Backward candidates was already filled or that the appellant was not an "Ex-serviceman". It was also not the case that any other more deserving person who could answer the description as one belonging to "OBC Category" as well as "Ex-serviceman" had not been selected. The Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were therefore in error in setting aside the appointment of the appellant as Forest Guard. The appellant shall be reinstated in service as Forest Guard within four weeks. The appellant shall be entitled to reckon the period of loss of service occasioned as a result of the decision by the Single Judge of the High Court as affirmed by the Division Bench, towards continuity in service. The Appellant shall, however, not be entitled to actual remuneration for the period of loss of service; But the Appellant shall notionally be entitled to reckon the period of loss of service towards computation of retiral benefits, if any.
2.	***Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 241*** ST certificate fraduently obtained though by approaching proper authority having jurisdiction and admission secured on that basis. The Srutiny Committee delaying in giving its finding. Rights of appeal provided thereafter compounding further delay. Meanwhile the candidate completing her course of study and seeking permission to appear in the final examination – In the peculiar facts and circumstances, Principal of the college directed to allow her to appear in the examination as a special case without making it a precedent. But her younger sister who secured admission by approaching an authority having no jurisdictiona and on the basis of order issued by High Court in favour of her elder sister and is in midway of her study, held, cannot be allowed to take advantage of ST status and her further continuance must be determined as a general candidate. 'Kolis' of Maharashtra – Held, belong to 'other backward classes' (OBD) and not to Mahadeo Koli category of ST. Despite the cultural advancement, the genetic traits pass on from generation to generation and no one could escape or forget or get them over. The tribal customs are peculiar to each tribe or tribal communities and are still being maintained and preserved. Their cultural advancement to some extent may be modernised and progressed but they would not be oblivious to or ignorant of their customary and cultural past to establish their affinity to the membership of a particular tribe. The Mahadeo Koli a Scheduled Tribe declared in the Presidential Notification 1950, itself is a tribe and is not a sub-caste. It is a hill tribe, may be like 'Koya' in Andhra Pradesh. Kolis, a backward class, are fishermen by caste and profession and reside mostly in Maharashtra coastal area. Kolis have different sub castes. Mahadeo Kolis reside in hill regions, agriculture, agricultural labour and gathering of minor forest produce and sale thereof is their

	avocation. Therefore, the cancellation of the social certificate issued by the concerned Executive Magistrates by the Scrutiny Committee was legal.	
3.	***T.N. Medical Officers Assn. v. Union of India,*** (2021) 6 SCC 568	
4.	***Union of India and Anr. v. R.G. Kashikar and Anr.,*** (1986) 1 SCC 458	
5.	***Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India,*** Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019	
6.	***State of Haryana and Ors. v. Piara Singh and Ors.,*** (1992) 4 SCC 118	
7.	***Rajendra Pratap Singh Yadav and Ors v. State of UP and Ors.,*** (2011) 7 SCC 743	
8.	***Ajit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.,*** (1999) 7 SCC 209	
9.	***The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. U.S.V. Balram, Etc.,*** (1972) 1 SCC 660	
10.	***M.R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore,*** 1962 SCC OnLine SC 147	
11.	***Mahavir Singh v. Staff Selection Committee and Anr.,*** (1986) 1 SCC 668	
12.	***Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,*** 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217	
13.	***Suraj Bhan Meena and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.,*** (2011) 1 SCC 467	
14.	***Dr. Sadhna Devi and Ors. v. State of UP and Ors.,*** (1997) 3 SCC 90	
15.	***Sukhnandan Thakur v. State of Bihar and Ors.,*** 1955 SCC On Line Pat 145-	
SESSION 3 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN PROMOTION AND TRANSFER MATTERS		
1.	Arpita Sarkar, ***Judicial Review of Reservation in Promotion: A Fading Promise of Equality in Services Guaranteed by the Indian Constitution,*** 11 NUJS L. Rev. 2 (2018)	**379**
2.	***Instructions and Guidelines on Seniority***, Department of Personnel and Training	**399**
3.	***Sealed Cover Procedure***, Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions Department of Personnel & Training	**481**
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5.	P. M. Menon, ***Towards Equality of Opportunity in India***, 94 INT'l LAB. REV. 350 (October 1966).	**497**
6.	Harshit Jain, ***Critical Analysis of Judicial Decisions on Reservation in Promotion***, 19 SUPREMO AMICUS 198 (2020).	**523**
CASE LAW *(Judgments mentioned below includes citation and short note for reference and discussion purpose during the course of the programme. Please refer the full judgment for conclusive opinion)*		
1.	***S.B. Dogra v. State of Himachal Pradesh,*** (1992) 4 SCC 455. The court will not disturb a seniority after a long lapse of time from when it was fixed.	
2.	***Imlikokla Longchar and Others v. State of Nagaland and Others,*** (2022) 17 SCC 236 It was held that the time spent in promotional grade on stopgap or ad hoc basis cannot be computed for determining length of service in that cadre unless contrary provision is made in concerned rules. The general principle of service jurisprudence is that the time spent in the immediate superior grade on stopgap or ad hoc basis ought not be computed for determining the length of service	

	of an incumbent in that cadre. This is of course subject to any contrary provision made in the applicable Rules itself. But no such contrary provision has been shown to us at the time of hearing of this appeal on behalf of the appellants of the State. Thus, computation of the appellants period of service in the feeder grade can take place only from the date of their regular appointment in that cadre. Also the period spent in a promotional post on officiating basis cannot be permitted to be factored in for calculating length of service in a particular post. Unless the Rules otherwise provide officiation in a particular post cannot encadre the incumbent in that post.
3.	***Prem Narayan Singh and Others v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh,*** (2021) 7 SCC 649 Incentive that was sought to be given to junior officers working as Civil Judges for promotion as District Judges solely on basis of merit would be defeated if their seniority in cadre of District Judge is not determined on basis of merit in LCE.
4.	***Chief Engineer and Secretary, Engineering Department, U.T., Chandigarh v. Kamlesh Baboo and Ors.,*** 1993 Supp (2) SCC 628.
5.	***All India Judges Association And Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,*** (2002) 4 SCC 247.
6.	***Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.,*** (2011) 7 SCC 789.
7.	***Ajay Kumar Shukla and Ors. v. Arvind Rai and Ors.,*** (2022) 12 SCC 579.
8.	***High Court Judicature of Patna v. Madan Mohan Prasad and Ors.,*** (2011) 9 SCC 65.
9.	***Ashok Pal Singh and Ors. v. UP Judicial Services Association and Ors.,*** (2010) 12 SCC 635.
10.	***State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa,*** 1966 SCC OnLine SC 23.
11.	***C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors.,*** 1967 SCC OnLine SC 112.
12.	***Ajit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.,*** (1999)7 Supreme Court Cases 209.
13.	***Union of India v. Kewal Kumar,*** (1993) 3 Supreme Court Cases 204.
14.	***B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,*** (1979) 4 SCC 507.
15.	***Rajendra Pratap Singh Yadav and Ors v. State of UP and Ors.,*** (2011) 7 SCC 743.
16.	***Joginder Nath and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,*** (1975) 3 SCC 459.
17.	***State of M.P. v. Bani Singh,*** AIR 1990 SC 1308 When the representation against adverse remarks is pending such adverse remarks cannot be considered for withholding of promotion.
18.	***R.K. Singh vs. State of U.P.,*** 1991 SCC (L&S) 1178; 1991 Supp (2) SCC 126 Once adverse entries are expunged the employee is entitled to promotion with effect from the date on which he was eligible for grant of promotion.
19.	***High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Madan Mohan Prasad,*** AIR 2011 SC 3046, (2011) 9 SCC 65 If the claim for promotion by respondent judicial officer was rejected in the earlier petition, for same relief, the second petition would not be tenable.
20.	***Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan,*** **AIR 2011 SC 3189,** (2011) 7 SCC 789 The mode adopted by the State was violative of rules of selection and promotion by merit where the rule provided for yearwise promotion and filling 50% of vacancies on merit basis but the State did not hold examination for selection for many years and also made clubbing vacancies of may years.

	employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country.
2.	***A. Satyanarayana Reddy and others v. Presiding Officer**, **Labour Court,*** (2016) 9 SCC 462
3.	***Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation,*** (2015) 6 SCC 321
4.	***Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri,*** (2013) 14 SCC 456
5.	***Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalya (D.Ed.) and Ors.,*** (2013) 9 S.C.R. 1
6.	***Lenin Kumar Ray Versus Ms. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd.,*** Civil Appeal No. 11709 of 2024
7.	***Krishna Gopal Tiwary & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,*** Civil Appeal No. 4744 of 2021
8.	***B. Prabhakar Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.,*** 1985 (Supp) SCC 432
9.	***Shripal & Anr. v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad,*** Civil Appeal No. 8157 of 2024
10.	***U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey***, 2006 (1) SCC 479. Socialism might have been a catchword from our history. It may be present in the preamble of our Constitution. However, due to the liberalisation policy adopted by the Central Government from the early nineties, this view that the Indian society is essentially wedded to socialism is definitely withering away. "The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court, probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing, is evident."
11.	***Vegoils Private Limited v. The Workmen***, AIR 1972 SC 1942 Labour Courts – no jurisdiction to deal with contract labour. Under sec 10 of the said Act tin jurisdiction to decide matters connected with prohibition of contract labour is now vested in the appropriate Government. w.e.f 10.2.1971, it is only the appropriate Government that can prohibit contract labour by following the procedure and in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act. The Industrial Tribunal, in the circumstances, will have no Jurisdiction.
12.	***Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. v. The Government of Tamilnadu***, (1985) IILLJ 509 Mad Which is the appropriate govt. for BHEL? "it must be held that the State Government is the appropriate Government with regard to the disputes in question"
13.	***Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Ors.***, (1997) 3 LLN 495 High Court upholds the State Govt's notification High Court upholds the State Govt.'s notification the notification had been issued after fully complying with the prescribed procedure under Section 10 of the Act to prohibit employment of contract labour after proper consultation with all relevant parties and evaluation of all relevant factors and materials by the State Government.

CASE LAW *(Judgments mentioned below includes citation and short note for reference and discussion purpose during the course of the programme. Please refer the full judgment for conclusive opinion)*	
1.	***State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy,*** 2025 SCC OnLine SC 382 The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a source information report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such that any reasonable person would be of the view that it *prima facie* discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be avoided.
2.	***Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar and Others,*** 2025 SCC OnLine SC 890 It is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine PW-1 caused prejudice to the appellant. The Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have compromised their ability to reach a fair conclusion by considering factors extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. The Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have disregarded that the informant, whose complaint initiated the disciplinary proceedings, was not made a witness. While a previous finding in respect of a guilt can form part of a subsequent charge-sheet to award enhanced punishment, the law requires the disciplinary authority to give sufficient notice to the charged employee of such intention to take the same into consideration for deciding the question of punishment. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant was arrested on 8th August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after his earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have not raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant's arrest. Having been arrested, the appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact of his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed that he requested PW-1 to notify the CID authorities of his arrest, but PW-1 failed to do so due to personal animosity. This appears to be probable, in the absence of any contra-material on record. Accordingly, this Court concludes based on the materials available on record that the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned order, thus, is unsustainable. Therefore, he would be approximately 74 years old in 2025 and around 45 years old in 1996, evincing that he had nearly 14/15 (fourteen/fifteen) years of service remaining at the time of his dismissal. The relief of reinstatement in service cannot be granted now. We are left to consider the quantum of monetary relief that would meet the ends of justice. Ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment of a lumpsum compensation of Rs. 30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the appellant inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents within 3 (three) months from date. The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at Rs. 5 lakh (Rupees five lakh), to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.
3.	***State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya,*** 2025 SCC OnLine SC 719 The court found no valid ground or reason to interfere with the direction of the High Court that the services of tainted candidates, must be terminated, and they should be required to refund any salaries/payments received. Since their appointments were the result of fraud, this amounts to cheating. For candidates not specifically found to be tainted, the entire selection process has been rightly declared null and void due to the egregious violations and illegalities, which violated Articles

	14 and 16 of the Constitution. As such, the appointments of these candidates were cancelled. However, candidates who were already employed need not be asked to refund or restitute any payments made to them. However, their services will be terminated. Furthermore, no candidate can be appointed once the entire examination process and results have been declared void. Some of the appointed candidates who do not fall within the category of tainted candidates may have previously worked in different departments of the State Government or with autonomous bodies, etc. In such cases, although their appointments are cancelled, these candidates will have the right to apply to their previous departments or autonomous bodies to continue in service with those entities. These applications must be processed by the respective government departments or bodies within three months, and the candidates will be allowed to resume their positions. Further, the period between the termination of their previous appointment and their rejoining will not be considered a break in service. Their seniority and other entitlements will be preserved, and they will be eligible for increments. However, for the period they were employed under the disputed appointment, no wages will be paid by the State Government or autonomous bodies. Further, if required and necessary, supernumerary posts may be created for persons appointed in the interregnum. Lastly, the court addressed the case of disabled candidates. The attention of the court has been drawn to one such case where the impugned judgment held that the appointee, Ms. Soma Das, shall be allowed to continue on humanitarian grounds. While the court did not interfere with this finding, it made it clear that other differently- abled candidates will not be entitled to the same benefit, as it would contradict legal principles and the rule of law. However, in consideration of their disability, these candidates will be permitted to continue and will receive wages until the fresh selection process and appointments are completed. The disabled candidates will be allowed to participate in the fresh selection process, if required, with age relaxation and other concessions. Similarly, other candidates who are not specifically tainted will also be eligible to participate, with appropriate age relaxation. In our opinion, such a direction would be fair and just, as it would allow these candidates to take part in the fresh selection process, which should now be initiated to fill the vacancies.
4.	***Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan,*** (2024) 1 SCC 175 While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin.
5.	***Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others v. Kamlesh Rani Bhatla,*** 2023 SCC OnLine SC 324 Resignation can become effective either by stipulation of law or by acceptance thereof. To illustrate the former situation, some statutory instrument may contain deeming provisions for resignation to become effective in the event after tendering the resignation letter, no decision is taken by the employer within a given timeframe. That is not the case here. So far as the present case is concerned, resignation can become effective only on acceptance thereof and sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 lays down situations in which there can be withdrawal even after resignation becomes effective. This question, however, does not arise here as what we are

	examining in this judgment is legality of an order by which the respondent's plea for withdrawal of resignation was rejected on grounds spelt out in the order itself. The Tribunal and the High Court found the reasoning of the appellant unsustainable. It was held that in the peculiar facts of this case, the judgment of the High Court sustaining the Tribunal's decision do not warrant any interference.
6.	***Sunny Abraham v. Union of India and Another,*** (2021) 20 SCC 12 Post-facto approval of charge memo by disciplinary authority not Permissible. Absence of expression "prior approval" in R. 14 of the 1965 Rules. Charge memo lacking approval of disciplinary authority declared "non est" by Coordinate Bench of Supreme Court in concluded proceedings in B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351.
7.	***Rajnish Kumar Rai v. Union of India and Others,*** (2023) 14 SCC 782 Prayer for transfer of case from CAT, Hyderabad to Ahmedabad Branch of same Tribunal on ground that petitioner was currently residing in Ahmedabad after retirement. Petitioner himself instituting proceedings at Hyderabad and matter was at final stage of hearing. Held, rejection of application for transfer by Principal Bench of CAT calls for no interference.
8.	***Union of India and Others v. Gandiba Behera,*** (2021) 14 SCC 786 The judgements under appeal cannot be sustained. There is no provision under the law on the basis of which any period of the service rendered by the respondents in the capacity of GDS could be added to their regular tenure in the Postal Department for the purpose of fulfilling the period of qualifying service on the question of grant of pension.
9.	***Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar,*** AIR 1990 SC 1368: (1990) 3 SCC 504 Compulsory retirement (if penal) must comply with Article 311. Even though the order of compulsory retirement may be couched in innocuous language without making any imputation against the Government servant, the court may, in appropriate cases, lift the veil to find out whether the order is based on any misconduct of the Government servant or whether it is *bona fide*. (i) Compulsory retirement in the public interest carries no stigma under Rule 16(3) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958 and the officer retains full pensionary benefits. (ii) Loss of efficiency at that age is a ground of public interest. It is not a punishment. Hence article 311(2) is not attracted. (iii) Even if adverse entries are not communicated, the order is valid if there are no *mala Fides Baikuntha v. C.D.M.O.*, (1992) 2 SCC 299; AIR 1992 SC 1020.
10.	***Post and Telegraph Board v. Murthy,*** (1992) 2 SCC 317: AIR 1992 SC 1368 Even an adverse report for a *single* year may constitute sufficient material for the Government to come to a decision that the employee's standard of work was not satisfactory and should therefore be retired. The reason is that the nature of the delinquency, and whether it is of such a nature as to require compulsory retirement is for the departmental authorities to decide. The court will not interfere with the exercise of that power except on the ground of *mala fides* etc.;
11.	***Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan,*** (1991) 1 SCC 588: AIR 1991 SC 471 Where the action proposed is not based on a report, or the disciplinary authority itself is the Inquiry Officer, the omission to supply a copy thereof to the delinquent will not vitiate the proceedings.

12.	***Prafulla v. State of Maharashtra,*** AIR 1992 SC 2209: (1993) Supp 1 SCC 564 Where the employee was acquitted on the merits and was reinstated on the basis thereof, and thereafter allowed to retire on superannuation, it would be against the interest of justice, to re-start the disciplinary proceedings against him on the basis of certain observations of the High Court in the case relating to a co-accused.
13.	***Indu Bhushan Dwivedi v. State of Jharkhand,*** AIR 2010 SC 2472. The uncommunicated past adverse entries in service record cannot be considered for imposition of punishment is respect of disciplinary enquiry.
14.	***Union of India v. Alok Kumar,*** AIR 2010 SC 2735 The "authority" is a generic term and is used in different places with different meaning and purposes.
15.	***State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha,*** AIR 2010 SC 137 Power of judicial review in respect of disciplinary proceedings by inquiry officer is confined to decision making process.
16.	***State of Punjab v. Ram,*** AIR 1992 SC 2188: (1992) 4 SCC 54 When a government servant has been dismissed in contravention of either Article 311(1) or Article 311(2), or of a mandatory statutory rule, or of the principles of natural justice, he would be entitled to bring a suit against the Government.
17.	***Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha,*** **(2011) 5 SCC 142 (154);** ***see*** **also** ***Ram Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh,*** AIR 2011 SC 2903. Whether any order discharging an employee, in exercise of the power conferred by the conditions of service amounts to an order of "dismissal" would depend upon several factors, such as- (a) the nature of the enquiry, if any, that may have been held; (b) the proceedings taken in the enquiry; (c) the substance of the final order passed on such inquiry; (d) material that existed prior to such order. A person holding a civil post under the state cannot be dismissed or removed from the service by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
18.	***Nelson v. Union of India,*** AIR 1992 SC 1981: (1992) 4 SCC 711 Where an order of dismissal is set aside by any court on the merits, but the competent authority decides to hold a fresh departmental proceedings against the delinquent officer, he will not be entitled to be reinstated or to recover arrears of pay since the date of the original order of dismissal on the ground that it was declared by administrative authority to be a nullity.
19.	***C.S.O. v. Singasan,*** (1991) 1 SCC 729: AIR 1991 SC 1043 The reasons recorded must *ex facie* show that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary inquiry, and must not be vague or irrelevant.
20.	***P.V. Srinivasa v. Comptroller Auditor General,*** (1993) 1 SCC 419: AIR 1993 SC 1321 Article 311(1) does not require that the inquiry should be initiated or conducted by a particular level of authority.
21.	***Babu Lal v. State of Haryana,*** AIR 1991 SC 1310: (1991) 2 SCC 335 Even where an order is innocuous on its face and purports to be an order of discharge in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment, the court can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order and to set it aside if it is penal in nature and was made

	without giving the employee any opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed for the misconduct alleged.
22.	The extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court are not fettered by any limitation. The court can grant any relief to meet the interests of justice on equitable grounds, *e.g.*, to direct the State to make some *ex gratia* payment to an employee whose appeal has been dismissed. *See* the undermentioned cases: (i) *Triveni v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, 1992 (1) SCJ 27: (1992) Supp 1 SCC 524: AIR 1992 SC 496, paragraph 31. (ii) *Rajendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, (1992) Supp 2 SCC 513: (1992) 21 ATC 699. (iii) *Prabhuswamy v. K.S.R.T.C.*, AIR 1991 SC 1789: (1991) 19 ATC 266: (1991) Supp 2 SCC 433 (SC). The court may reduce a punishment of 'removal' into that of compulsory retirement; *Mohal v. Sr. Supdt.*, (1991) Supp 2 SCC 503: AIR 1991 SC 328: (1991) 1 LLN 301, paragraph 6.
23.	***Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni v. Corporation of Greater Bombay,*** (1992) 2 SCC 547: AIR 1992 SC 786 According to the Departmental Rules, there is some difference between dismissal and removal, as to their consequences. Thus, while a person 'dismissed' is ineligible for re-employment under the Government, no such disqualification attaches to person 'removed'.
24.	***Aggarwal v. Union of India,*** (1992) 2 UJ SC 266: AIR 1992 SC 1872 A "Tenure post" means a post held for a specified term. The appointment terminated on the expiry of that term. The question of superannuation or of premature retirement does not arise in case of such post.
25.	***Uttar Pradesh State Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Suresh Kumar,*** AIR 2011 SC 3296 Where an appointment was made for a fixed period, reinstatement could not be granted beyond that fixed period.
26.	***Vijay S. Sathaye v. Indian Air Lines,*** AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 514 Absence of employee for long period amounts to voluntary abandonment of service. Order for granting voluntary retirement not required.
27.	***UOI v. Devjee Mishra,*** AIR 2016 SC 4605: (2016) 10 SCC 445 *Misconduct of overstaying leave by Corporal in Air Force*- Respondent at the relevant time was working in the rank of Corporal in 37th Wing of Air Force and was posted at the Bhuj Air Force Station in the State of Gujarat. Departmental action was taken against him for over-staying the leave period. In the proceedings before the District Court Martial, the respondent/petitioner pleaded guilty to both of the charges. Punishment of three months' rigorous imprisonment to be followed by dismissal from service and also reduced in rank was recommended against him. The findings and sentence given by the Court Martial were confirmed by the Competent Authority but on remitting such portion of rigorous imprisonment as would remain un-expired on the date of promulgation. On that basis the respondent stood dismissed from service. In proceedings, he was given the assistance of law-qualified officer from other Air Force Station. Plea that the respondent/petitioner was pressurised by some official to make confession was found without subsistence, was rejected. Punishment imposed

	on the respondent/petitioner by competent authority was upheld. *(Air Force Act, (45 of 1950), Sections 39 and 107)*
28.	***Swaraj Tractors Division, Punjab v. Raghbir Singh,*** AIR 2004 SC 1234 *Misconduct*-The respondent, a workman, absented himself from duty as per the version of the FIR on a murder charge which was registered against him. A show cause notice was issued to him but he did not respond. He did not participate in the enquiry. He did not make any attempt to communicate with the appellant seeking leave of absence. Held, enquiry could not be held vitiated by the principles of natural justice. Termination of his service was upheld. As the respondent workman had put in 12 years of service, the Court directed the appellant to pay *ex-gratia* amount of rupees three lakhs.
29.	***Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi,*** AIR 2004 SC 2131 (2135): (2004) 4 SCC 550 *Absence on medical grounds-No misconduct*. In the instant case, the appellant had absented himself for two months, eight days and 17 hours on medical grounds. The rules provide that penalty of removal can be imposed only in cases, if grave misconduct and continued misconduct indicating incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The Court said: "The absence of the appellant on medical grounds with application for leave as well as sanction of leave can under no circumstances be termed as grave misconduct or continued misconduct rendering him unfit for police service." Dismissal was set aside and court ordered re-instatement subject to condition that the period during which the appellant remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which the appellant reported back to duty pursuant to this judgment shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. The appellant shall not be entitled to any service benefits for this period.
30.	***Sep. Satgur Singh v. UOI,*** AIR 2019 SC 4047 *Unauthorised absence from duty - Army personnel discharge from service* - In reply to the show-cause notice, the appellant has not given any explanation of his absence from duty on seven occasions. He has been punished on each occasion for rigorous imprisonment ranging from 2 days to 28 days. A Member of the Armed Forces cannot take his duty lightly and abstain from duty at his will. Since the absence of duty was on several different occasions for which he was imposed punishment of imprisonment, therefore, the order of discharge cannot be said to be unjustified. The Commanding Officer has recorded that the appellant is a habitual offender. Such fact is supported by absence of the appellant from duty on seven occasions.
31.	***Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G. Madak,*** 1981 (2) SCC 714 Merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered.
32.	***Baljinder Pal Kaur v. State of Punjab,*** (2016) 1 SCC 671 *Acquitted in Criminal case* – Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.3- In the instant case, PWs had turned hostile, hence, the accused delinquent employee was acquitted. The decision of the department not to set aside the order of dismissal and re-instate the employee in service was not interfered.
33.	***R.L. Bhtail v. UOI,*** (1970) 2 SCC 876 Making of an adverse entry is thus not equivalent to imposing of a penalty, which would necessitate an enquiry or the giving of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned government servant.

34.	***Gurdial Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab,*** AIR 1979 SC 1622; (1979) 2 SCC 368 In accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report.
35.	***Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskendar Ali,*** AIR 1980 SC 1242; (1980) 3 SCC 428 Remarks in confidential roll are not intended to cost any stigma on the government servant.
36.	***Swami Saran Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,*** AIR 1980 SC 264; (1980) 1 SCC 12 Compulsory retirement within a few months after allowing the crossing of the second efficiency bar, without any adverse entry in between is illegal.
37.	***Brij Behari Law Agarwal v. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh,*** AIR 1981 SC 597; (1981) 1 SCC 490 If two confidential reports, one favourable and the other adverse, are given by two successive officers for overlapping periods, the retiring authority is not justified in relying upon the adverse one for the purpose of compulsory retirement.
38.	***State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa,*** AIR 1987 SC 1201; (1987) 2 SCC 602 Adverse remarks should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned so that he can act in accordance with advice and improve his service career. The whole object would be lost if adverse remarks are communicated after inordinate delay.
39.	***Union Public Service Commission v. Shri Hiranyalal Dev,*** AIR 1988 SC 1069; (1988) 2 SCC 242 Adverse remarks set aside must be treated as non-existent in the eye of law.
40.	***Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer Baripada,*** AIR 1992 SC 1020; (1992) 2 SCC 299 An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on showing that while passing it, uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration.
41.	***Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana,*** AIR 1997 SC 2105; (1997) 4 SCC 14 Object of communication of adverse remarks to employee is to afford an opportunity to improve himself in efficiency in public service.
42.	***R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P.,*** AIR 2012 SC 2962 (2962); (2012) 8 SCC 58 Adverse remarks/entries in service record of an employee are not wiped out by subsequent promotion of grant to time scale.
43.	***Arun Kumar Gupta v. State of Jharkhand,*** AIR 2020 SC 1175 Adverse entries with regard to integrity do not lose their sting at any stage. A judicial officer's integrity must be of a higher order and even a single aberration is not permitted. Senior Judges of the High Court who were the members of the Screening Committee and Standing Committee have taken a considered and well-reasoned decision. Unless there are allegations of *mala fides* or the facts are so glaring that the decision of compulsory retirement is unsupportable the Supreme Court would not exercise its power of judicial review. In such matters the Court on the judicial side must exercise restraint before setting aside the decision of such collective bodies comprising of senior High Court Judges.

44.	***Veerendra Kumar Dubey v. Chief of Army Staff,*** (2016) 2 SCC 627, *Narain Singh v. UOI,* AIR 2019 SC 4433 Mere award of four red inks entries does not make the discharge of the employee mandatory.
45.	***Mahendra Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar,*** AIR 2011 SC 1790 The appellant would not be entitled to pension where on reading order of termination using word 'discharge' in entirety if it is clear that such order is of dismissal and it has used word 'discharge' by mistake.
46.	***Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal,*** (1970) 3 SCC 548 Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. … The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.
47.	***L.K. Tripathi v. State Bank of India,*** (1984) 1 SCC 43; AIR 1984 SC 273 It is well-established that any action resulting in penal or adverse consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice. To sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation must show that prejudice was caused, as affirmed by this Court.
48.	***Hanumant v. Disciplinary Authority in Shape of the Honourable District and Sessions Judge,*** 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 129
49.	***M. Rajendran S/o Ramunni Nair (Late) v. Director General, National Council of Science Museums, Calcutta and others,*** 2021 Indlaw CAT 36
50.	***Union of India and others v. P. Balasubrahmanayam,*** 2021 Indlaw SC 92
51.	***Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRS & Ors. v. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and Others,*** (2011) 10 SCC 1.
52.	***ST. Mary's Education Society & Another v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and Others,*** (2023) 4 SCC 498.
53.	***Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,*** (2023) 13 SCC 401
54.	***Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors.,*** (1997) 1 SCC 444.
55.	***Arani Mukhopadhyay v. Employees Provident Fund Organization & Ors.,*** 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 3639.
56.	***Ram Autar Singh v. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.,*** (1998) 9 SCC 666
57.	***Guru Prasad Lal v. Coal India Limited,*** 1996 SCC OnLine Cal 154

58.	***Subodh Ranjan Ghosh v. Sindri Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr.,*** 1956 SCC OnLine Pat 61
59.	***1. T.G. Shivcharana Singh (in WP No. 184 of 1963) & ETC. v. State of Mysore***, 1964 SCC On Line SC 82.
60.	***Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah v. Union of India,*** 1963 SCC OnLine SC 42.
61.	***State of U P & Ors. v. Luxmi Kant Shukla,*** (2011) 9 SCC 532.